"What a piece of work is a man ! How noble in reason ! How infinite in faculty ! in form and moving, how express and admirable ! in action, how like an angel ! in apprehension, how like a god ! the beauty of the world ! the paragon of animals !"William Shakespeare, Hamlet, 1604, Scene 2
"Loving humanity is easy, but liking its individual specimens is jolly hard work !"Rabbi Lionel Blue, 1990
Taking science beyond its current material limitations, and extending it to cover complex systems in all realms, requires a transcendence of some of the concepts that currently restrain it. Science is about our human relationships to the world about us, and as such suffers from many of the problems of prejudicial viewpoint that affect such relationships. Our objectivity can only be relative, based as it is upon world views that are often grounded in lower level human characteristics and historical constraints.
A metascience, able to consider all aspects of our universe, mental as well as physical, needs to be based on a metahumanity, a view of humanity that in itself dissolves the barriers that separate us from the physical world and limit us as individuals (the subject/object dualities). Science is ultimately a social activity, it relates to a consensus view of the world. This consensus can be made at a low metaphysical level or at a high one, in other words it can operate within a restricted world view or can grow to embrace the full possibilities of our reality. We will pursue the latter aim here.
Our science operates within the philosophical ideas of our time, yet there is often a delay between new philosophies and their concrete effects upon human behaviour. Much of our current Western thinking is still based upon the philosophies of ancient Greece and the Renaissance, the ideas of the superiority of reason, the universality of Aristotelian logic, the dualisms of mind and body, the mathematically perfect versus the empirically imperfect, the geometry of Euclid, the superiority of the state over the church and fixed hierarchies of power, organisation or worth.
Such ideas have all been superseded in complexity philosophy by more advanced concepts, yet these ideas have not so far greatly influenced either the popular view of the world or the approaches we take within science. The scope of our world view depends to a large extent upon the axioms or assumptions that we accept as basic constraints. We have been gradually dissolving some of the old constraining axioms (in non-Euclidean geometry, in relativity, in quantum physics etc.) but many still remain and form barriers to more advanced scientific thought.
Let us list some of the mental approaches and assumptions that we may need to overcome:
First those directly affecting the way we pursue science. Many of these have proved highly useful in the past, but are no longer justified as universalities (based upon findings in either philosophy, science or both):
Although all these are important, for our purposes we will concentrate on only the last four, those aspects that relate to the contextual employment of scientific knowledge.
Secondly those functions related to general social behaviours and our motivations, in other words the social organisation under which our scientific world operates and is judged:
We will not try to treat all of these issues here, but will concentrate now on the last
one as this is crucial to our wider view of mind and complex science.
These are those related to lower animal or plant behaviour, essentially
concerned with the physical world and our physical existence. They include
eating, drinking, breathing, growth, response, shelter/warmth, reproduction,
security/survival, resting, waste disposal and health.
Moving up to a higher level we have the more sophisticated needs
associated with the emergence of mind and community in the middle and
higher animals. These add to the list such needs as communication, display,
status, belonging, curiosity, stimulation, pleasure, mobility, play, comfort and
forward planning (resource stockpiling and simple goals ).
At the top of the needs hierarchy are those higher needs attributed to
fully developed humans, and these are usually claimed to be applicable only
to our species. They encompass, amongst others, arts, music, science,
mathematics, religion, love, philosophy, truth, justice, ethics, history, beauty,
compassion, sensitivity, companionship, equality, creativity, education,
wisdom, unity, inner calm, insight or enlightenment, and freedom.
This latter grouping comprises what are called Metaneeds, since they go beyond or
transcend the rest of the natural world. It will be noted that the chief desire
of many people, money, is not even listed. This is quite
deliberate since money itself is not an end need (like food), but simply a
means to an end (thus just accumulating money is not even as clever as
a squirrel hoarding its nuts...).
The swapping of means and ends in this way leads us to confuse our
actual needs with something that can generate only a limited potential
for achieving them. Money cannot buy metaneeds since they are essentially
internal to our minds (abstract qualities) and do not exist as 'things'. Wealth
occasionally can be useful, since some material objects and services
can help us develop or realise these higher mental capabilities, but its role is
mostly restricted to being a social exchange mechanism for the balancing
of those needs at the lower Primal and Social levels of our existence
(trading material goods and labour, with money as simply a debt accounting measure).
Given that our most valuable needs (what it means to be human) are these
metaneeds, we can look into the motivations that we need to instil into people
so that they may be realised. It seems clear that before we are able to pursue
these higher needs we must make sure that the lower ones have been sufficiently
met, and this is perhaps why we see so much emphasis in our societies on
money and material goods. Yet we must realise quite clearly that such
pursuits are just means to higher ends and are not the ends in themselves.
By meeting only the Primal and Social needs we create (at best) not humans
but merely fully satisfied animals. Metaneeds are subtle needs, they need
a stable environment in which to grow, and this is what we seek by the satisfaction
of lesser needs. Like a delicate flower, our creativity is easily destroyed, noise due
to external or internal disturbance disrupts the intuitive concentration essential to metaneed
expression. It is mainly for this reason that we should devote attention to stabilising
our physical and psychological environment. The commitment to achieving
these higher metaneeds is what we call Metamotivation, and we can examine
our own priorities and lifestyle against our needs hierarchy, to determine what
proportion of our time is dedicated to realising this aspect of our humanity.
The ability to pursue metaneeds should be our main aim in society, and
we must resist aspects of culture that forces people into concentrating only on social aspirations
or even worst just primal survival. The failure to enable our higher human
needs is what is called Metapathology (Maslow) and it operates separately
for each of our metaneeds (as far as they interest us). It manifests in
internal conflicts between our desires to be fully human and the social
frustrations and limitations that prevent the realisation of these needs.
The diseases of metapathology are not treatable by chemicals, they are
not physical level imbalances but abstract level ones. Just as we cannot
treat social ills by bodily medicine (we must use social level methods, e.g.
politics), the treatment of metapathologies must be by abstract level
methods (e.g. self-actualization), combined if
necessary with social ones.
To be Metahuman is to recognise the full contextual scope of our nature, to
live in such a way as to achieve our highest possible human goals and to
help others to do the same. In many ways metamotivated people treat the
pursuit of ends as ends in themselves, in other works the means
become the ends and satisfaction with the ongoing processes become
our ultimate goals. In this evolutionary view the end ceases to be a fixed goal
but becomes an ever expanding set of possibilities which can be continuously
experienced - in other words it is not the winning but the taking part that is
important. We see these metavalues in the behaviour of contented
people everywhere, whether artists, gardeners, explorers, philanthropists,
mystics or whoever. Each shows a transcendence of those values we have
designated as the lower levels, and this indicates to us that all those
higher values that best motivate and satisfy in other fields (the metavalues)
should ideally form part of a value related science also.
Having defined metahumanity we can now look at how we can apply these
ideas to science. We saw elsewhere that values
could be objective, so we can relate our metaneeds and metamotivations to
this by saying that these should comprise our scientific metavalues, the desired
fitness goals of our metahuman science. In other words, we wish our science
to give us the knowledge we need in order to best achieve these ends, and this
gives an overall direction to our scientific enterprise. It will be noted that these values
are not material ones, none of our scientific values are such since they comprise emergent
properties of mind. By explicitly grounding our science in the non-material world we
free ourselves from the delusion that science cannot speak about psychological or
spiritual concepts - it already does so implicitly.
Current science is often regarded as a search for pure knowledge, value free
facts, yet we know that facts without context are just noise and the scientific context
itself imposes values. Science must say not only what there is, but also what this implies
and not conceal or ignore valid contextual significances. Our required change here is to take
account of not just a single set of values (relating to consistency, scope, prediction and so on
- all abstract level scientific values) but to add in the other metavalues also. In both mind and
world all these needs are inter-related and thus a complex science cannot act as if they are
independent. We must formulate a scientific methodology that can incorporate and
appraise values beyond those common to our sciences of the simpler aspects
of life.
We noted earlier a number of barriers to a wider view of science, and if we are to
dissolve these obstacles we need to replace our original implicit scientific axioms
or assumptions with a new explicit set that allows this more comprehensive view.
We will list these here (informally), and note that by gradually adding back the old
assumptions as additional local constraints we have the effect of restricting the
scope of our science to the traditional boundaries, thus our new scheme is
compatible to, but more general than, previous science.
One dimensional simplifications of an either/or nature are rejected as
valid total system descriptions (e.g. living v non-living). Classification boundaries
are allowed for investigation, but are not regarded as inherent system features
nor having validity for overall decisions.
Truth is relative to the included scope of the system under study.
Objectivity definition must specify the boundaries and constraints, the
contextual limitations of any theory.
Causality is determined by connectivity, and varies from simple
linear cause-effect simplifications to complex networks of causal loops.
The validity of a linear simplification is context dependent and this must be
detailed.
Systems include emergent properties, the relations between levels,
and the coevolution within a level. Systems have non-uniform structures in
general, with non-equivalent parts. Reductionism is valid in the investigation
of the parts but not the system properties.
This is a superset of traditional logic and allows partial truths and
set membership, as well as traditional excluded-middle special cases.
Traditional boolean logic is applicable only to special cases, and if used
must be justified.
Includes the associations between variables, allowing facts to have
values in conjunction with other facts and nonlinear effects on each other.
Simplifications to single or independent variables are special cases and
must be shown to be valid contextually.
Includes the static, chaotic and self-organizing phases of systems,
in which deterministic and statistical science forms special cases.
Includes the transient effects of historical perturbations and memory
canalizing the current possibilities and future development in state space
(non-ergodic). Other alternative (non-real) paths are still valid subjects of
scientific study for the investigation of system potential.
Includes all the different temporal scales, from the snapshot (unchanging
assumption) often employed, to the long-term integration of all trajectories.
Non-equilibrium systems are included and initial trajectories regarded as
important and not discarded.
Allows sub-system diversity, contextual fitnesses rather than
permanent solutions permit alternative valid theories in differing circumstances.
Ethics incorporated as choices between fitness alternatives based on human
values, allowing culturally relative scientific theories.
Permits creative growth into unknown state space, world line merging
or splitting added to the conservation assumptions of conventional science.
This permits scientific study of artistic (teleological) developments and possibilities,
along with stochastic change.
Integrates emotions and senses with intellect, to give an intuitive
multidimensional parallel perception, rather than a serial simplification of values.
All forms of knowledge at all levels contribute to fitness, rational simplification
is valid only as a part of the evaluative process.
Includes primal, social and abstract needs levels, full humanity
affects scientific values and thus the fitness of theories. The emphasis
on only material components is seen as a error of omission.
Includes positive and negative sum scenarios, properties are not
assumed to be conserved (zero-sum) and only exchanged but exhibit synergistic
interactions. Fitness is measured as the net transactional effect.
These axioms remove the constraints that prevented us applying science properly
to mind subjects. They relate to incorporating our metavalues along with the lower
values, thus taking science above the merely material and allowing us to
investigate the higher levels of our collective reality in an objective way.
To evaluate scientifically systems based upon metaneeds (e.g. mind) we need to employ
concepts of theory fitness that can cover complex value interactions, i.e. that can relate to
multilevel values. We need also to recognise that at any level multiple aspects will
exist simultaneously (the different needs listed earlier for example). We cannot isolate a
single aspect (e.g. scientific prediction or energy) and maximise its fitness alone since changes to
properties affecting that dimension may have knock-on effects on the other dimensions that use
the same parts or are connected to them. For example, maximising our freedom
implies that we have no responsibility or obligation to others but this conflicts
with the other values e.g. justice, compassion and companionship. On a more
material level, maximising engine power conflicts with minimising pollution
and cost. These interplays of values mean that we cannot understand single
aspects of any system in isolation, but must also understand how the variables
interact and compromise in providing the overall multiple functions that are
common to complex systems. This is a shift in perspective from normal science
which concentrates on single contexts and assumptions of disjoint properties.
Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan, What is Life ?, 1995, pg. 26
Overall fitness relates to a correlation between the system and its environment,
such that the operation of the combined whole achieves the best result for
the system (and conversely the best result for the environment also - an Evolutionary
Stable System). Thus a scientific theory must additionally take into account how the
system function depends upon the context in which it is found. This is relatively easy
with manmade systems, since they were designed to meet a need and the
relevance of all the system features are known. For natural systems and
especially mind, this is much more difficult. Their complexity often means
that we oversimplify, making assumptions of independence between features
that are at best dubious, and at worst so misleading that our theories prove
worthless. Taking account of interactions naturally brings in the subject of
values, since these relate to the goals of the system and thus the functions
included. Our science must thus be expanded to include this teleological aspect,
which in scientific terms merges the idea that our science has goals with the
equivalent idea that the subjects of our science (including ourselves) also may
have goals.
Scientific method nowadays relates to what is usually called the
'hypothetico-deductive method'. In this we detect a mismatch between
our data and our worldview, a new hypothesis is then generated to
explain this data. We make deductions from this hypothesis to arrive at
some new predictions, experiments are then made to try to falsify
those predictions. If instead the results verify the expectations, then we have
confidence in our new hypothesis and it becomes a scientific theory or law.
It should be noted that in practice 'scientific laws' are not applied in
isolation but in conjunction with auxiliary statements or boundary
conditions, and these relate to the contextual simplifying assumptions we
mentioned earlier.
This is all fine as far as it goes, but for metascience we need to add
a bit more, what we can call the 'hypothetico-deductive-evaluative (HDE) method'.
These additions relate to how our scientific theories correspond to metahuman
goals, in other words how do they help us to enhance our positive actions and reduce
negative ones, and are they the best ones that can be used for this purpose.
Science is about the systematization of all our knowledge,
so already includes a number of concepts, e.g. descriptions (data),
hypotheses (tentative conjectures), explanations, models (abstractions from reality),
predictions, experiments (tests), theories, laws (theories of universal applicability).
What is not yet included is alternatives, choices, values or fitnesses - those operations
relating to possibility, variability, usefulness and context.
Most science restricts itself to finding a single theory that fits the facts. Alternatives
are seen only when disagreements between scientists lead to differing hypotheses
being proposed. Yet the first theory to be thought of is not necessarily the best,
nor is the second or third. State space has many possibilities and an important
aspect of metascience thinking is the identification of the full range of options in
any situation. This is hard to do, and often the better options are screened off
from us by our own assumptions (e.g. Einstein's Relativity was unthinkable
within a Euclidean geometry assumption). Evolutionary thinking however, with
the concept of a fitness landscape, can aid us in considering the wider possibilities
and in choosing the option that maximises our goals. This idea is more difficult to
apply in multidimensional contexts, but relates to understanding the elements of
our theories, their combinations, interactions and criticality in achieving the desired
result. It should be possible to formalise this theory space, but we will here only
emphasise that multiple alternative theories always exist.
Rather than testing a theory in isolation (against limited data), it is better to test
alternative theories against each other. These tests are then effective in choosing
between optional theories within worldviews. This is an indeterminate view of
science, in which theories don't reflect universal truths but take into account
their local context or purpose, and how it relates to the contexts of other people
and other aspects of our environment - this emphasises their generality and thus
overall human value. This brings science into line with our general behaviour
and implies that tests should be based upon multiple relevant values. If this is not the
case, as in many traditional experiments, then it is up to the scientists involved
to justify the additional constraints that they have chosen to place upon their
experiments, and of course the generality of the results must be restricted
therefore in the same way (to situations where those constraints and
independencies hold).
It is these unspoken constraints that often allows science to appear exact, but
such mathematical precision is frequently the result of employing such tight
constraints that possibility is forced to conform to minute areas of state space,
i.e. accuracy is inversely proportional to allowed freedom. Freedom of choice
therefore implies that we must relax our obsession with absolute one-dimensional truth and this
has major repercussions as to how we view science, in that we now recognise
that scientific constraints are imposed values that may in themselves have no justification.
We must explicitly examine these boundary conditions before acceptance,
with a view to determining whether the options forced to be constant (the controlled
conditions) are such that the results invalidate application of the theory in practice, in other words
it proves to be a theoretical fabrication with no practical value.
For scientific tests, every outcome of an experiment must be measurable,
in other words all the results must be taken into account. This allows
for falsification and not just the accumulation of supporting data (as often
seen in pseudo-scientific claims where contradictory data is suppressed).
But in order to derive fitnesses we need also to include all the confirming
instances, such that the relative probability of the result can be estimated.
This doesn't mean double counting the same data by repetition of the same
experiment, but does mean including experiments that provide different associations,
so testing/verifying is done over more than one dimension. This mode of
probability accumulation relates to the mode of operation of our neuronal
networks, and says that a confirmation of one possibility weakens the
probability of others. This aspect isn't made explicit in conventional
science which rarely tries to quantify such probability issues.
Taking all the results into account means documenting all the knock-on
effects also, in other words the inter-relationships between the variable
of interest and others in the system. This aspect is also missing from conventional
experiments which by concentrating only on the factors of interest (in
theoretically isolated contexts), generate theories with unexpected side
effects (e.g. in medical drug testing). The difficulty with testing only in the
domain of interest is that complex systems comprise multiple domains
(attractors) which manifest in different environmental contexts and at different
points in the system life-cycle. Effects seen within one domain will generally not
serve to predict effects in quite different situations, since interactions active elsewhere
will have been absent in the testing domain. The more subtle and long term the
spin-off effects, the less likely they are to be noticed, yet in complex systems
such chaos related effects can be highly significant in overall system terms
and do need to be included (not assumed negligible as a matter of course).
Traditional science was all about applying control, the predictions were to allow
mankind to dominate nature, to force it to fit his many one-dimensional needs.
In metahuman science this is no longer acceptable, since taking into
account the fitness of nature, as well as human needs, requires that we
maximise the benefits to all (positive-sum overall) and not just to ourselves in
isolation (giving negative-sum overall). Science is about potentiality not actuality,
it should show us the objective possibilities for action (and in the metascience view also
highlight the effects of those possibilities on our values) but in itself science
should not choose any of them for implementation. This divorce of control from
science yet the inclusion of values incorporates ethics into science and restores choice back to humanity. Failure to allow scientific precision and methods in
overall value assessment leads to such decisions being made instead on less
objective grounds, and this must lead to prejudices and inaccuracies that could so
easily be avoided. Scientific work can continue without considering values,
but this needs to be made explicit and such science divorced from that direct simplistic
influence in decision making that we see too often (since, by design, it fails to take account of valid
contextual data). The faith placed in scientific pronouncements based on
one-dimensional research is an erroneous one, due to the inevitable failure of
these scientists to take into proper account the wider issues beyond their
specialisms. A new breed of interdisciplinary contextual scientists are required.
Rather than the intrusive experiments of conventional thinking (or the isolated
one-dimensional 'value free' reductions often employed) we should look to
experimental forms that are non-intrusive (as far as possible). In other words
observational experiments which collect data from real life operations without
disturbing them in the process, or complex computer simulations where
alternatives can be modelled in a multidimensional and coevolutionary way.
The dangers of juxtaposing single-dimensional conclusions and assuming
they can be applied to the multidimensional case cannot be stressed enough.
This procedure is invalid in the case of nonlinear systems, the mathematical
principle of superposition does not hold (e.g. f(x+y) is not equal to f(x)+f(y)
and f(ax) is not equal to af(x) ), so if the best option for me is A and for you
is also A this does not mean that the best combined option
will be A (e.g. see the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario in Game Theory).
Values relate not to 'things' but to 'processes', relationships, and by refocusing
science onto processes instead of objects we can more easily relate
our thinking to the hidden values that are behind our scientific assumptions.
In general a process has a function, an evolution, and this forms a transformation
from some initial state to a final one. Objects are a form of process (a static
one in effect) where the input and output are equal, so will still be included
in a process based science. The factors that drive processes include
both the internal interconnections (information processing) and the external
interactions (constraints and data). As we have seen these associations
also give meaning or value to the process with respect to the context in
which it takes place.
Putting values back into the assessment of the fitness of a theory
means including these wider context implications also. In other words,
we ask if the explanation helps us to make judgements that increase our
own fitness and that of our world. The effective use of knowledge
(and that is what science aims to provide, rather than just useless
facts) means that it must be seen to be compatible with human needs,
and here that means metaneeds also. A scientific theory must structure
the world in a way that promotes positive-sum actions (if it is to be of benefit),
and if two theories differ in this aspect then this criterion is a valid one by
which to choose between them.
We must also take account of the global associations of any theory.
Unlike supposedly 'value-free' theories, which maintain that position
by being artificially divorced from context and thus single-dimensional,
value related theories must integrate with all aspects of life. Thus if
a metascientific theory is to be successful it must dissolve barriers
between its field and the rest of our world and not increase them.
In other words it increases the correlation between human and
nature, by internalising what is 'out there' (now in relation to all the
physical and mind levels - social and abstract) such that our actions
better match the integrated fitness requirements of the whole.
Let us assume we have executed a traditional scientific process and
arrived at a tested scientific theory. Before we proceed to apply it, we
need to ask some additional questions relating to how it affects fitness.
This is the 'evaluative' stage we have added to conventional science
(we are assuming here that it follows the conventional sequence, but
ideally it would integrate with the hypothesis stage onwards in order
that we would test only the better theories) :
Does it need some of the traditional scientific assumptions, and if so
can a reformulation widen its generality (perhaps moving an existing axiom
to a local constraint instead) ? This question helps us to understand the
contextual limitations that result from our normal thought processes and
the possible benefits of relaxing them. It makes explicit the boundaries of the
proposed theory and indicates whether it is a systemic theory applicable to all
levels or is restricted to specific modalities or subjects.
Here we explicitly widen the search space, using the characteristic
of this theory to help prompt our imagination to discover alternatives. We
can also use the identified scope to formulate more general hypotheses
applicable to wider areas of our reality. Here we look to identify the best
formulation of our theory, the one with potentially the greatest effect.
Traditionally this could be pure knowledge, but we can ask what other's
needs are potentially affected and what knock-on effects this theory may have
on other existing theories and views of life. This aspect asks about the
value of the theory for humanity, i.e. what use it can be. Does it force changes
in social and/or scientific norms ? Can we use it to question current assumptions
and our wider expectations ?
How does it inter-relate to our current associations. Does it clarify any
of our values, does it add any new ones ? Here we look to understand what
practical effect the theory can have on our world view, in other words what
additional fitness information it potentially supplies.
Does the theory increase positive-sum options and/or reduce negative sum ? Does it help us to generate new life options and if so are these positive
or negative in overall effect ? This relates to how the various values created
interconnect and compromise in producing an overall fitness evaluation.
Does it have a stabilising or destabilising influence on our society ?
Does it help to unify matter, mind and spirit or separate them ? Does it
reduce conflict, prejudice and specialisms or increase them ? This is the
highest level holistic value, the global 'ought' and relates to a viewpoint
that rates every level equally as contributing to universal fitness. This
means that nature, society and individual must operate as one towards
ends that meet all their fitness needs - this being assumed to result in
the best overall result.
Some form of self-experimentation is needed in order to answer these
questions, since they all relate to abstract (non-material) implications of
the theory and are thus internal to our minds. Yet these are also open to
objective examination, we can document and share our reasoning before
arriving at a consensus scientific position as to the significance of any theory.
Let us briefly try to illustrate these ideas by first considering a traditional scientific
theory and applying these evaluative concepts retrospectively to it.
The Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection
This states that organisms evolve gradually based on random genotypic
variations causing fitness differences in phenotypes which are then preferentially
selected for survival and reproduction (following the neo-Darwinian formulation).
Scope - Moving the need for a separate genome to a local constraint widens the
theory such that it can apply to uncoded systems (e.g. ideas, immune systems,
ecosystems and brains). Selection can be both natural and artificial and this allows
a further widening to a general multilevel theory of change. Random variations can
be combined with directed ones to widen further the possibilities. This theory is
thus seen as a narrowly constrained version of a much wider general evolutionary
theory and in its present form forcibly restricted to biology and genetic evolution.
Alternatives - We can question the assumptions of 'gradual', 'random', the causing
of phenotype changes, preferential selection and so on, generating many alternative
formulations for comparative testing, including the complexity science 'attractor'
variant.
Goals - The traditional goal is just reproduction (of gene or individual to taste), but in
a wider formulation it relates to our wider needs, thus the goals will vary with context.
This multidimensional formulation better describes organism behaviour and this has
major implication to such areas as sociobiology and society, since we can avoid
simplistically biased assumptions as to the purpose of evolution and thus the purpose of life.
Values - Survival has a number of knock-on effects, especially in ecosystem terms.
Preservation implies information continuity, the usefulness of knowledge (in whatever
form). We see that in the natural world cooperation (sharing knowledge or trading
resources) is at least as common as competition and more positive-sum.
Fitness - This relates to balancing our goals, to compromise between multiple
values. We can reformulate natural selection in non-competitive terms by saying
that that which adds fitness is selected, and this can be cooperation. This new
emphasis allows us to look to synergistic aspects of systems in place of the traditional conflict viewpoint.
Integration - Fitness as a coevolutionary value helps integrate the world, and as
this cannot be decided correctly 'context free' it helps relate behaviours to wider
viewpoints. We can see that simplifications that leave out the wider context lead
to divisive views of evolution, by creating disjoint fitness measures for separate
parts.
All in all, adding a wider evaluative meaning to this theory seems helpful in
avoiding a blinkered view of a concept that seems applicable well beyond its
traditional boundaries. In such circumstances we would be wise to distrust
a viewpoint that purported to show implications within this narrow biological field that
would be rejected as invalid in analogous areas.
We can now try to apply our new scientific method to a traditionally unscientific
theory, again ignoring its source for this exercise.
The Theory that Beauty is in the Eye of the Beholder
Scope - We can extend the idea by adding other metavalues, of which beauty
is just one dimension, for example justice, love, truth, music. Thus we extend the
theory to be a general theory of relative value and could evaluate it accordingly.
Alternatives - We can easily add the alternatives that beauty is an absolute,
that it is a social value or God given, that it involves more that just visual modes. We can
perhaps more easily test such alternatives against each other than quantify a single theory
of beauty in isolation.
Goals - In its present state it explicitly relates to only one metaneed, but in
practice many others form part of the concept since beauty must be applied
to something as an higher level value. This does force us to look beyond the
material world and consider what exactly does a mental abstraction like this
mean to us, in other words how do we regard beauty in our civilisation.
Values - The implication is that value can only be judged in an individual
context. This allows that alternative viewpoints must be tolerated and generates
a respect for diversity and novelty. It relates to the idea that people can validly
have different contexts and thus aesthetic values that differ accordingly.
Fitness - If only individual fitness matters here, then we need to ensure that
actions based upon this theory do not infringe the fitnesses of others. This is an
effective test of the theory, since if this does not prove to be true the original
concept is inadequate.
Integration - This theory is both apparently divisive and integrative in
practice. Tolerance is implied and this must be stabilising, yet diversity will
increase specialisms. Taking local alternatives into account however means that
individuals have a better chance of achieving an optimum personal fitness, and this
should lead to a higher integrated fitness.
Overall evaluation of this theory again raises issues that a simplistic viewpoint
neglects. Relating the theory to overall fitness helps to ground it in testable
consequences. We avoid the need to define such a vague concept (which
has historically proved to be a unproductive task) by asking instead what are the practical
implications of what we say, and this allows scientific methods to be applied
to this non-material idea.
The idea of metaneeds, non-material measures of human values, shows us that
the emphasis in traditional science on material animal issues leads to an inherent
conflict between that science and humanity. The scientifically prized 'value-free'
detachment discards those very properties that make science worthwhile in the first place.
Metahumans, in contrast, are in tune with themselves, with their environment and with
abstract possibility. They have no mismatch between mind, matter and spirit and can
use an inherent integrated value system that covers all these levels of existence.
We can employ science to successfully evaluate these issues if we extend its rules in such
a way as to encompass social and metaneeds, and that is what we mean by Metahuman
Science. The failure to adopt such a wider contextual view restricts science to disjoint dimensions,
a dangerously narrow viewpoint leading to error, poor judgement and unbalanced research directions.
Recognition of the idea that facts themselves generate contextual values however allows us to overcome
old scientific prejudices and to better understand the meaning of the facts and theories
produced by our scientific work.
This science takes more note of alternative possibilities, it includes context as
part of the scope of a theory, it relates the theories to our human needs and
values, but most importantly it removes the restriction that science must be
about 'things' in allowing it to be applied to social and abstract issues. This
is done by adding the concept of fitness, such that we can ask in any situation
how the alternative viewpoints each affect overall fitness, taking into account
not just a single creature (as in neo-Darwinism), but all the environmental and future
consequences. This is a form of objective testing, and serves to ground social, psychological,
philosophical or religious discussions in a concrete scientific framework, such that we
are able to evaluate 'ought' questions and not just the 'is' focus of conventional science.
This new perspective forces science to face the inter-relationships between
its assumptions and those of the wider world of which it is a part, and perhaps
can both reduce the conflict between science and the rest of human values
and impose some validity checks on areas currently regarded as outside scientific
thought.
Metaneeds
Our human needs can be placed into three main groupings:
Primal or Basic Needs
Social or Interpersonal Needs
Abstract or Spiritual Needs
Metamotivation and Metapathology
Metahuman Science
Metascience Axioms
Metafitness
"Independence is a political, not a scientific, term."
Metascientific Method
Alternatives
Choices
Experiment
Control
Process Values
Fitness Evaluation
Value Science Example
Metahuman Science Example
Conclusion
Page Version 4.83 July 2007 (paper V1.0 September 1999)